PDF

Jan09-letter-response.pdf

Professor Al-Ghazi argues that it is not faith, as I contended, but strict adherence to religious doctrine (which he describes as “consistent with ignorance”) that is the enemy of science. He backs up this assertion with three points. First, he provides examples where dogmatism (both religious, exemplified by the Catholic church at the time of Galileo, and non-religious, exemplified by certain physicists of the early twentieth century who couldn’t come to terms with the scientific revolution unfolding before their very eyes) was itself an enemy of science. Second, he provides several examples of respected scientists who were/are also religious. Third, he mentions that many structures enjoyed by modern society have their origin in religious thought processes.

Let me address the first and third points briefly before getting to the second point, which I find subtler and more interesting. As for the first point, any dogmatism – religious or otherwise – is a clear enemy of science, but religious dogmatism is obviously an offshoot of faith, so one could argue that faith is ultimately to blame. I fail to see the relevance of the third point to my article, so I will not address it further, except to say that “religious thought processes” have had both benefits and costs throughout history, and the question of which outweighs the other is both interesting and complex.

The second point, that religion and science can co-exist within the same person, is not necessarily related to the issue of whether faith inhibits the teaching of science. Nonetheless, I would like to take this opportunity to comment upon it. As I said in my article, I think faith and science are antagonistic. I am puzzled by people – and I know there are many; cliché though it may be to say so, some of my best friends (and respected colleagues) are religious – who can compartmentalize their thinking so well.

If I were to approach such a person and say “I think electrons are mauve,” they would surely (and rightly!) ask me what proof I have (or, less confrontationally, what makes me think so). On the other hand, if I said “I believe in the Holy Trinity” (or Islamic angels, reincarnation, etc), there is a good chance they would agree with me – or disagree, favouring instead a different though still completely unsubstantiated belief.

Indeed, suppose that person himself held the belief that the electron is mauve. It is natural to expect that he would ask himself why he believes this. (I imagine he would also be inclined to abandon the idea, in the absence of some sort of substantiating evidence). Why, then would he not ask himself why he believes in the Holy Trinity? And if he does ask himself this question, why would he not try to devise a means to prove it, and, being unable to do so, question this belief? That is a mystery to me.

R. MacKenzie, Université de Montréal