Most physicists still believe that a time honoured procedure known as the “scientific method” gives us a yardstick by which all new knowledge can be assessed and final scientific truth determined.
The idea is probably due to Robert Boyle who three hundred years ago maintained that experimental work should be clearly and quickly reported so that others might repeat,confirm and profit. This has been an accepted tenet of scientific research ever since[1]. That Boyle should initiate the idea is not difficult to understand. Much of his work in physics required the operation of the air pump which he head developed with the help of his technically brilliant assistant Robert Hooke,. However, it seems that Hooke and only Hooke could normally get the pump to work reliably, so Boyle set down in detail all accounts of successful experiments so that others might confirm them elsewhere at a later date. In this way, the scientific method was born.
Its central role at the heart of scientific research is now, however, drawn into question. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the scientific methods, “one considered a rigorous procedure that included the study of theories, hypotheses, laws and methods of explanation, is now regarded as a family of methods each of which differs according to the subject matter involved.”[2] With that in mind let me briefly review three new and disturbing subdivisions of science, namely pathological science, precautionary science and consensus science, and relate them to the statement above.
“Pathological science” was first discussed by Irving Langmuir in 1953 when he examined a number of documented cases in which good scientists had apparently reported wrong results, and continued to believe in unsubstantiable data. The phrase pathological science was used to identify a variant of normal scientific behaviour. More recently, however, Douglas Morrison of CERN, in a paper presented to the World Hydrogen Energy Conference in 1990, has indicated that pathological science is alive and well in the field of “cold fusion research”. Developing some ideas of Langmuir, Morrison showed that such science might be categorised by three phrases, one in which an original report is quickly confirmed, a second in which there are equal numbers of positive and negative results and a third in which there is an avalanche of totally negative results.
In understanding the nature of such results, his final conclusion was that the desire to achieve a certain result in a local community may influence the work of a number of scientists for a long or short time. Most face up to reality quickly, but some never do. The scientific community can generate believers who will continue pursuing their belief despite all scientific evidence to the contrary[3]. The scientific method does not per se safeguard the scientific community from such a situation.
Secondly let me refer to “precautionary science” as recently discussed at length in the New Scientists[4]. Here we have a situation in which scientists ar apparently incapable of delivering irrefutable facts in support of environmental issues. In the absence of any demonstrated causal relationship between environmental effects and human activity it is proposed that remedial action should be taken nonetheless, in case and before such a relationship is established. Precautionary science deals technically with what might conceivably happen but is to a degree scientifically unsound because it advocates action in the absence of scientific proof.
In addition “consensus science” has suddenly appeared upon the physics scene. Bill Mitchell in a recent article in Physics World has discussed global climate change from the point of view of the physicist[5]. He points out that, thermodynamically, the system is not in thermodynamic equilibrium and that there are intrinsic difficulties in defining or measuring the mean global surface temperature so beloved of computer modellers at the present time. There is in fact no single set of parameters which can be used to define the global climate. However, despite the intrinsic difficulty with the physics, there appears to be a “consensus” among “300" environmental scientists that manmade global warming could be 1-8 K by the year 2030. Consensus is a new concept for science. Mitchell interprets it as saying in this case that because prediction can only be made after simulation with a model, similar models are giving similar results. So, in the absence of any physically reliable prediction about the biosphere, consensus takes over. All that can be said is that there may be manmade warming in the future; its extent may be greater than the current consensus view or it may be less. This is the rigor of the concensus position.
So what can we conclude? Has the scientific method lost its relevance through abuse (as in pathological science) or inapplicability (as in precautionary and consensus science)? Are we returning to an Aristotelian view of nature where the whole is believed to be greater than or not understandable in terms of its component parts?
The Editor will welcome the opinions of readers of Physics in Canada on this troublesome and ill defined topic.
References
Jasper McKee, P.Phys.
Editor, Physics in Canada
mckee@physics.umanitoba.ca
Editorial Board welcomes articles from readers suitable for, and understandable to, any practising or student physicist. Review papers and contributions of general interest are particularly welcome.